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Chapter IV 
Naval Warfare and The Environment 
Rear Admiral William H. Wright, IV, u.s. Navy* 
D eterrence, as articulated in the National Military Strategy,l promotes the ideal condition for the protection of the environment. The devastation of 
the aggressor's homeland should be reason enough to pursue a course other than 
war ••. yet wars exists. Certainly, in the course of the two World Wars, mankind 
took a severe toll on the environment-to say nothing of his fellow man. During 
the Cold War era, the military forces of the two superpowers necessarily had an 
adverse impact on the environment as they prepared for possible conflict. The 
environmental damage caused by fifty years of weapons development, maintaining 
large standing forces, and exercising and operating their forces, has yet to be fully 
assessed. But it certainly is far less than would have been the case if World War 
III had come to pass. The environmental damage, as seen on CNN, during the 
Gulf War highlighted again the degradation that military forces can inflict on the 
environment in wartime, increasing pressure to regulate the impact that military 
operations have on the environment in war, as well as peace. 
From a military perspective, remedies for environmental concerns should be 
pursued with appropriate consideration given to future contingencies requiring the 
use of military force; preventing friction between environmental policy and the 
realities of military conflict. An absolute ban on environmental damage caused by 
military operations is inconceivable. War by definition is a "no holds barred affair". 
Thus, the real issue is how best to minimize the environmental impact of military 
operations without constraining the military commander with policies that have little 
chance of serious consideration in wartime. But most importantly, we must not create 
uncertainty or risk aversion in the minds of our commanders regarding environmental 
considerations that could be exploited by their adversaries. 
The Nature of War 
Doctrine defmes war as "a violent clash between two hostile, independent, and 
irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other."z The very nature 
of war is synonymous with human casualties and environmental damage. Warfare 
will always have an adverse impact on the environment; the extent will depend on 
the willingness of warring nations to conform to environmental regulations that 
may constrain their ability to achieve victory in the war. Thus, as a practical matter, 
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expansion of the law of war to cover environmental concerns could be done in a 
manner similar to the approach taken in addressing humanitarian concerns. That 
is, avoiding environmental impact cannot be absolute; clauses like "military 
necessity" will be needed to recognize that a military commander realistically 
cannot be expected to place his force or his mission achievement at grave risk to 
enemy action in order to protect the environment. Nevertheless, military 
commanders can legitimately be expected to show due regard for avoiding 
unnecessary environmental damage in the conduct of warfare. 
Can war be fought with due regard to the environment? Environmental concerns are 
having an increasingly significant impact on the conduct of peacetime U.S. military 
operations. But does compliance with environmental regulations end when war begins? 
Simply put, can we effectively conduct war using environmental "Marquis of 
Queensberry" rules when dea1ingwith a "street fighter"who is notsimilarlyconstrained? 
Naval Warfare Imperatives 
Operating on and from the sea, naval forces have a unique ability to provide 
credible combat forces throughout the world. With the sudden change from the 
Cold War-with a single, overriding global threat posed by the other 
superpower-to the post-Cold War environment of multiple potential regional 
security challenges, the operational demands placed on naval forces have become 
much more diverse. Naval forces are increasingly being called on to provide the 
myriad capabilities needed to ensure success across the entire spectrum of military 
operations. In order to respond decisively to the crisis of the future, we must 
remain ready, flexible, self-sustaining and mobile in peacetime.3 In war, we must 
maneuver and project fires without restraints. Underpinning the Navy's ability to 
provide credible combat forces prior to conflict and during combat are four 
strategic naval imperatives: realistic, demanding operational training, unimpeded 
mobility at sea, proven warfighting doctrine and effective weapons. 
Training 
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps train to fight and win the nation's wars. In 
doing so, we train to a high level of professional competency that allows us to also 
carry out a broad range of military operations while we posture ourselves for war. 
Any encroachment on our ability to conduct operational training degrades mission 
effectiveness. Skills such as anti-submarine warfare can only be honed through the 
prosecution of targets which requires the deployment of sonobuoys, smokes, 
explosive signaling devices and torpedoes (exercise and war reserve). Our naval 
aircraft must conduct low-level bombing on land and sea targets and surface ships 
must fire their guns. Naval forces must seize, and be given, every opportunity to 
utilize these weapon systems under conditions which simulate realistic operations. 
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Not doing so ultimately creates exploitable vulnerabilities within naval forces. 
Without training as we intend to fight, we limit the effective utilization of the force 
in time of war. 
Although environmental regulations are not aimed at naval forces specifically, 
they require compliance that impacts, directly or indirectly, on our ability to train 
effectively. Statutes such as the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Statute designate various sea areas as national marine sanctuaries. As the number 
of these sanctuaries increase, they begin to encroach on traditional near-shore 
training areas. These statutes require vessels to delay, modify or cease training in 
order to protect certain species of marine life. This conformance significantly 
affects naval training operations in or near these sanctuaries. A newly established 
marine sanctuary in Hawaii, for example, and the designated whale critical habitats 
in submarine transit areas off Georgia and Florida, may lend to a serious impact 
on naval operations. Although these areas may not be completely restrictive, they 
do require added operator awareness and compliance efforts that can detract from 
the realism and effectiveness of training. Environmental compliance has thus 
become an integral part of planning naval operational training. Ultimately, a poi~t 
could be reached in which environmental regulations significantly degrade the 
effectiveness of operational training. At this juncture, we will have reached,a point 
where our military no longer has the confidence or capability to meet the enemy 
on his terms without incurring unnecessary loses. Protecting the environment at 
the expense of human life does not meet anyone's sanity test. The challenge, thus, 
is to credibly articulate that in peacetime. 
Weapon firings are a crucial element of peacetime training for combat ,readiness 
on deployment. But weapon firings are also of great concern to environmentalists. 
The military weapons range on Kahoolave Island in Hawaii was closed for several 
reasons; some included environmental concerns. Other weapons firing ranges are 
subjects of possible closure or added restrictions. Recently, the Olympic Coast 
National Marine Sanctuary, an area of several thousand square miles, prohibited all 
bombing activity in a preexisting training area. As weapons firing ranges are closed 
or subjected to restrictive regulations, the impact on combat readiness will increase. 
Naval forces will continue to be innovative and resourceful in working around these 
obstacles while pursuing their training objectives. But a trend is apparent that could 
eventually produce shortfalls in our combat readiness. 
Mobility 
This nation, by virtue ofits geography, is a maritime nation. Our vital interests are 
worldwide. When combined with our national strategy of engagement, naval forces 
become the force of choice to operate forward and to be engaged, poised to defend 
critica1links abroad. An enduring attribute of naval forces remains its ability to operate 
forward in support of national interest, secure through mobility upon the waters of 
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the world. The law of the sea provides a context of navigational freedom that is 
essential in meeting national objectives. A high degree of mobility across the broad 
oceans, through choke points and in littoral regions, is a prerequisite to the success 
of naval forces in executing the national security strategy. 
Mobility can be impeded significantly by international or domestic regulation 
in the name of a protected environment. Nations wishing to impose their 
sovereignty beyond the internationally recognized 12 mile limit may use 
environmental concerns as an instrument of partial leverage. Economic zones can 
be redefined to include pollution and waste requirements during peacetime which 
serve to impede our freedom of navigation. As the focus on the environment gains 
momentum, these types of regulations represent clear dangers. The Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships (APPS) (33 USC 1901-1908) provides for the U.S. 
implementation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL). Although a domestic statute, APPS imposes greater 
environmental obligations upon U.S. warships than is required under MARPOL. 
Any movement by the international community to implement reciprocal 
standards will impact naval operations abroad. Heavily used sea lines of approach, 
such as the Straits of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits, are likely candidates for 
onerous environmental restrictions. Environmental concerns brought forth by the 
possibility of collision or the fact that heavy transit of straits may pollute those 
waters could result in regulation which restricts, limits or prohibits transit without 
some toll for clean-up. Although hypothetical, many foreign ports already have 
anti-pollution regulations: Hong Kong and Singapore to cite a few examples. 
Restrictions in accessing ports, either for pollution and waste regulation or for 
nuclear safety matters similarly impede our ability to sustain forward presence and 
remain engaged globally. Pon visits are integral to supplying, servicing and 
providing morale for forces abroad, as well as showing the flag. These are key 
elements in the "engagement" policy of our nation. As environmental concerns 
grow, we must, in the name of national security, challenge those initiatives that 
encroach on our mobility in much the same manner that we must resist regulations 
that inappropriately or excessively restrict our free trade upon the oceans and 
within the ports of the world. 
Another development which can hinder the full mobility of our naval forces 
would be any requirement for naval vessels to enforce environmental regulations. 
Naval units have already been trained and tasked to maintain continuous vigilance 
for driftnet fishing vessels and for ships discharging unusually large quantities of 
waste into the oceans. Just as the humanitarian concerns of rescuing "boat people" 
around the world interfered with routine operations, a parallel situation can be 
drawn in which naval forces required to be engaged in enforcing environmental 
regulation lose their focus from primary responsibilities. This tasking, if 
significant, could additionally overtax commanders and complicate priorities. To 
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maintain our freedom of mobility, naval forces must clearly understand and 
maintain a balance between their primary mission and their obligations to the 
international community. 
Naval Warfighting Doctrine 
Sea control, sea denial and power projection are fundamental naval missions. 
u.S. naval forces train to these missions through tactical doctrine to become the 
most effective combat forces afloat. The precise operations and tactics executed 
during war support the naval doctrine that will hopefully yield the greatest success 
in battle. Dominance of the sea and power projection ashore will inevitably result 
in the sinking of warships, mining of harbors or striking at strategic centers of 
gravity. Understanding the environmental impact of these evolutions, naval 
commanders have an obligation to weigh the expected and necessary 
environmental impact of the evolution against meeting the military objective. 
However, to what extent must the commander maneuver to avoid a wildlife refuge? 
Will a commander be required to select limited precision munitions over "dumb" 
weapons because of possible collateral damage to the environment? In war, to fight 
and win will always be of primary concern. Therefore, commanders must fight 
without unnecessary uncertainty of the tactical options available. The law of war, 
over time, has evolved to include sanctuaries during armed conflict which have 
the general support of the international community. With due regard to the law 
of war, commanders must follow the doctrine they have applied in training in order 
to optimize their chances of success in conflict. 
Targeting, as with doctrine and tactics, requires the utmost clarity in order to 
meet military objectives. Again, the law of war has established sanctuaries such as 
cultural locations, hospitals and religious monuments, and has prohibited targets 
such as dams-which if severely damaged could unleash forces which would create 
extensive collateral damage. Any alternative targets selected by virtue of 
environmental concerns must be weighed against the consequences and impact 
those alternatives may have on the success and risks of the entire military 
operation. History has many examples of significant military targeting decisions 
which were made with due regard to humanitarian concerns and which changed 
the course of the battle. Environmental damage can be minimized through 
cognizance of environmental concerns. But it should remain clear that in war there 
are no absolutes; but winning is almost everything. 
Weapons 
It goes without saying that our naval forces must be properly trained and 
equipped to fight and win the nation's wars. Naval forces must be provided with 
those weapons which will give our forces the clear advantage in conflict. With the 
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scaling down of our naval forces, it is more important now than ever to field 
munitions which can do the job effectively with fewer numbers. Our current 
arsenal of strike weapons, over-the-horizon (OTH) missiles, naval gun projectiles 
~nd mines are moving towards precision applications which, by definition, will 
reduce collateral damage to the environment. However, less damage to the 
environment is a fallout from developing precision munitions and not the key 
factor in their development. The weapon development process currently analyzes 
potential environmental consequences with respect to applicable laws and 
regulations pertaining to pollution, hazardous material and ecological impact.4 
Full compliance with these regulations can lead to excessive cost and or 
modifications to the weapon. We must, therefore, seek a balance between optimum 
weapon performance and total environmental compliance. Blast effects, heat, and 
residual by-products from fuel or explosives must be considered in the 
development of weapons to ensure that they can first meet the capability 
requirements. It should continue to be our primary concern that we provide our 
fleet the arsenal needed to inflict high levels of damage on hostile forces in order 
to bring conflict to a decisive, early conclusion and minimize risk to our forces. 
An early conclusion also can reduce death, destruction and environmental damage. 
Conclusion 
Environmental regulations, foreign and domestic, must be clearly written so as 
not to be misinterpreted by local or state agencies or by the international 
community, nor to place unwarranted restrictions on naval forces beyond the 
intent of the regulations. Mobility is fundamental to naval forces; both in peace 
and war. Regulations that restrict transits of naval vessels due to environmental 
concerns ignore the importance of mobility and freedom of navigation to naval 
forces in crisis, peacetime operations and training. Although the need to protect 
the environment is clear and widely accepted, international regulations that place 
absolute prohibitions on environmental impact will probably receive minimum 
support and inconsistent compliance from countries with significant military 
forces. As a practical matter, application of environmental regulations to the 
wartime operations of military forces must recognize that avoiding environmental 
impact cannot be the sole consideration. But military commanders can 
legitimately be expected to show regard for avoiding unnecessary environmental 
damage in the conduct of their operations. 
The U.S. National Military Strategy is built upon the three pillars of 
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and 
winning our nation's wars.5 Naval forces, in support of this strategy, will be 
forward deployed, and manned, equipped and trained to fight and win.6 The 
naval imperatives of realistic, demanding operational training, unimpeded 
mobility at sea, proven warfighting doctrine and effective weapons are crucial 
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to the success of naval forces. Environmental regulations that infringe on these 
naval imperatives could seriously limit the Navy's ability to carry out national 
strategy. In essence, naval forces, by their forward and credible capability, actin a 
preventive role against war •.. and the environmental damage that is so involved. 
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